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Abstract 
The German government is strongly involved in redistributing income. For various 
reasons such as the capacity to govern and social stability this makes a good under-
standing of the citizens’ respective preferences and their informal coalitions ex-
tremely important. The identification of such interest groups is non-trivial as they 
may be determined by latent characteristics and preferences for redistribution are 
difficult to measure. The aim of this study is to identify latent interest-groups in the 
context of preferences for redistribution adopting an inductive approach. The data 
for the estimation of the WTP values is generated by a DCE, based on a representa-
tive sample of 1,538 German individuals. To identify the latent interest-groups we 
investigate to which extent respondents can be divided into groups using Latent 
Class Models thereby accounting for both observable and unobservable heteroge-
neity within the society. Based on the econometric analysis we can identify six so-
cial interest groups that differ regarding their preferences for redistribution and their 
composition. Both, their preferences regarding the overall budget for redistribution 
and their preferences regarding the different recipient groups as well as the socio-
demographic determinants for group membership are plausible and match well with 
the current political situation in Germany. 
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1 Introduction 
The knowledge of citizens’ preferences as well as the resulting voting coalitions are of outmost 
importance for issues like the capacity to govern and social stability (Foley and Edwards, 1996; 
Richardson, 2000). In this context, topics such as redistribution that involve huge budgets and 
affect a large number of voters receive considerable attention. In welfare states, much of the 
political discussion is devoted to redistributive issues, i.e. who should receive benefits, subsi-
dies or transfers and who should pay for it through taxes or contributions. 
In this political process – building on the conceptualizations of Truman (1951) and Olson 
(1965) – any collection of individuals and ultimately voters that share common characteristics, 
attitudes or interests can form an interest group. As long as this group lacks any form of organ-
ization and interaction, this is called a potential or a latent interest group. Despite their lack of 
formal organization and genuine political initiative, knowledge about the composition and the 
size of such usually large groups gains relevance. In Germany, for example, the political agenda 
as well as election campaigns are increasingly driven by opinion polls rather than party ideol-
ogy and leadership (Jucknat and Römmele, 2008; Becker and Hornig, 2014). The identification 
of such informal groups is non-trivial as they may be determined by latent characteristics; their 
interests are usually concrete and multidimensional while the overall issue – in our case pref-
erences for redistribution – is rather abstract, hence difficult to measure and to observe.  
On the basis of representative data from Germany we identify such latent interest groups with 
regard to redistribution. Besides the overall volume of redistribution the distribution of re-
sources between different recipient groups are considered. We overcome methodological is-
sues of prior studies by accounting for selected socio-demographic as well as latent character-
istics using data from a discrete choice experiment (DCE). The DCE was conducted in the field 
– based on a sample that is representative of the German voting age population – and was 
collected in 2012 specifically for the analysis of preferences for redistribution. The DCE frame-
work enforces trade-offs and budget constraints on the participants. We obtain willingness to 
pay (WTP) values that allow us to compare the strength of preferences across groups and with 
respect to the different recipient groups. The use of Latent Class Models allows for an inductive 
approach of identifying the latent interest groups without having to rely exclusively on observ-
able factors. This expands the scope of the analysis of studies such as Alesina and Giuliano 
(2011), Neustadt and Zweifel (2011) and Pfarr (2013) that to some extent analyze preference 
heterogeneity but focus separately on single observable factors. Our results may help to explain 
some of their partially surprising or inconclusive evidence. 
We find six distinct latent interest groups that can be characterized by their composition as 
well as their preferences. Besides expected differences for example between retirees and family 
oriented individuals we also see heterogeneity within categories, e.g. with regard to the will-
ingness to accept any form of reform that changes the status quo. By virtue of the WTP values 
we can see which changes in the redistributive scheme will help to convince which groups to 
approve a proposed alternative. Our findings are plausible when we compare them to the po-
litical situation in Germany and can be used to inform policy makers as well as empirical and 
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theoretical economists on relevant factors that need to be considered when decomposing pref-
erences for redistribution. In political economics most models are based on majority votes, thus 
the analysis of latent interest groups can provide a better understanding on the potential com-
position of such majorities. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section describes in more detail 
our contribution in the context of the existing literature. The following explains the background 
as well as the econometric features of DCEs and introduces LCM. Subsequently the design and 
the implementation of the field experiment are presented. Section 5 highlights the results. Fi-
nally, we discuss and conclude on our findings. 
2 Literature  
Overall the literature on preferences for redistribution is vast. The theoretical foundations are 
to a large extent provided by the baseline work of Romer (1975), Roberts (1977) and Meltzer 
and Richard (1983) – focusing on individuals’ utility derived from their income and on the 
median voter. This literature is the starting point for most models that incorporate other factors 
such as the dynamic relationship between inequality and growth, past or expected social mo-
bility, inequality or fairness considerations. Alesina and Angeletos (2005) and Benabou and 
Tirole (2006) are two examples of more recent implementations that explicitly account for the 
interplay of such at least partly psychological factors and economic rationality. 
The related empirical evidence is mixed, mostly due to the fact that it is rarely one factor that 
drives the results and that for data and methodological reasons it is difficult to capture all po-
tential aspects at once. Overall, empirical studies on preferences for redistribution can be cate-
gorized by at least four dimensions: Firstly, the level of aggregation – i.e. micro or macro data, 
secondly, the determinants they look at, thirdly, the ends of redistribution – if any – they dif-
ferentiate and fourthly, the method used to elicit preferences. In the following we illustrate how 
our approach relates to these dimensions as well as the pertaining literature. 
Macro level analyzes of the effects of income levels (e.g. Fields and Ok, 1999; Karabarbounis, 
2011), of inequality and growth (e.g. Alesina and Rodrik, 1994), of the role of political insti-
tutions such as different electoral systems (e.g. Milesi-Ferretti et al., 2002; Persson and Tabel-
lini, 2003 and Feld et al., 2010) or the role of political parties (e.g. Perotti and Kontopoulos, 
2002) are of limited relevance to our study as we aim at exploring preference heterogeneity at 
individual level and at identifying social interest groups within a country. The same is true for 
studies that relate to the effect of ethno-linguistic fragmentation on preferences for redistribu-
tion (e.g. Luttmer and Singhal, 2011; Fong, 2006 and Alesina et al., 2012). 
Some of these factors are also analyzed in studies looking at individual level determinants. 
Such micro level studies focus mostly either on economic factors, such as past, current or ex-
pected income and social status (e.g. Alesina and Giuliano, 2011; Alesina and La Ferrara, 
2005), behavioral factors, such as beliefs regarding the role of luck and effort (e.g. Alesina and 
La Ferrara, 2005; Alesina and Angeletos, 2005; Fong, 2001; 2006), altruism (e.g. Andreoni 
and Miller, 2002; Fong et al., 2006 and Fong and Oberholzer-Gee, 2011) or religion (e.g. 
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Benabou and Tirole, 2006; Gruber and Hungerman, 2007). While all of them can closely relate 
to theoretical models and look at specific determinants while controlling for selected other 
observable aspects, they do not provide insights on the composition of latent interest groups 
which are very likely influenced by a number of observable and non-observable factors. 
In this context and also with regard to our analysis other socio-demographic characteristics 
without a direct connection to the aforementioned models gain relevance, e.g. such as employ-
ment status, education, age, gender and race. For example, Alesina and Giuliano (2011) and 
Guillaud (2013) cover family structures and gender and Fong (2001) and García-Valiñas et al. 
(2008) elaborate on the education of voters. 
Regarding different ends of redistribution, Alesina and Giuliano (2011) point out that the two 
core objectives of the welfare state – redistribution from the rich to the poor and providing 
social insurance – are difficult to disentangle. But the authors argue that as they are close cor-
relates, from an empirical point of view, this is not fatal. While being appropriate in most cases, 
this means that in almost all of the aforementioned studies redistribution is interpreted as the 
size of government – including redistribution and social insurance – without differentiating 
according to the goals or the recipients of the redistributive measures. We argue that the ends 
to which the redistributive budget is used does have a significant impact on the formation of 
interest groups and is closely linked to the socio-demographic characteristics of individuals. 
The interaction of these two aspects determines an individual’s expectation regarding the effect 
of a change in the redistributive system on his personal utility. 
The aim of discriminating different ends of redistribution is closely linked to a methodological 
challenge that most of the survey based studies face. Usually, authors try to capture preferences 
for redistribution through questions such as “To what extent do you agree or disagree with the 
statement, ‘It is the responsibility of the government to reduce the differences in income be-
tween people with high incomes and those with low incomes’?” (for example Alesina and La 
Ferrara, 2005 and Corneo and Grüner, 2000). Such questions neither allow to differentiate be-
tween recipients nor do they impose a budget constraint. In cases in which similar questions 
target specific recipient groups like the elderly or the sick, this is of limited use as long as the 
inherent trade-offs are not enforced. Furthermore, such typical survey questions capture atti-
tudes – i.e. some degree of favor or disfavor – rather than preferences as defined by microeco-
nomic theory (Eagly and Chaiken, 1996; Kahneman et al., 1999). 
Some studies try to overcome these problems by implementing choice based experiments in 
field surveys. For example Boeri et al. (2001; 2002) use contingent valuation (CV) to analyze 
attitudes towards redistribution with a focus on pension schemes and unemployment insurance. 
In such CV setups respondents have to state the maximum amount of money they are willing 
to pay to get or to avoid a certain good or scenario (cf. Mitchell and Carson, 1989; Bateman et 
al., 2002). This approach enforces some trade-offs – especially regarding the price of the good 
– but does not account for trade-offs between the remaining characteristics. Investigating the 
shares of redistribution that are dedicated to different recipient groups requires an approach 
which enforces trade-offs between all characteristics. Thus standard CV are not able to separate 
valuations for different recipient groups of redistribution. 
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Another alternative are discrete choice experiments (DCEs) which again confront respondents 
with hypothetical choice situations. In contrast to CV, all characteristics of the choice options 
are allowed to vary. The willingness to pay is not stated directly but derived from the price 
which is just one of several varying characteristics that can be covered in a DCE. Besides ex-
plicit trade-offs between all characteristics this approach also implements a budget constraint 
(Louviere and Lancscar, 2009; for more details on DCE see section 3 and 4). If in the context 
of redistribution such attributes also reflect different recipient groups, this allows to obtain a 
much more detailed picture of preference structures. Furthermore, the approach is rooted in 
microeconomic theory and thus allows to approximate preferences in terms of willingness to 
pay (WTP) rather than pure attitudes (Bateman et al., 2002). Summarizing, DCEs have a num-
ber of advantages over the aforementioned approaches, which makes it the preferred method 
for our study. 
In the context of redistribution, this method has been implemented in two studies (Neustadt 
and Zweifel, 2010; Pfarr, 2013). Both studies analyze preferences for redistribution on the basis 
of a DCE – using WTP as a proxy for the strength of preferences and accounting for different 
ends of redistribution by incorporating alternative allocations between recipient groups. Simi-
lar to the standard microeconomic studies mentioned above they analyze different theory based 
determinants for preferences for redistribution. Moreover, Neustadt and Zweifel (2011) also 
try to shed some light into preference heterogeneity that is driven by socio-demographic cha-
racteristics by looking separately at the effects of age, employment and health status in a Swiss 
context. They hypothesize that an insurance motive explains most of the preferences, i.e. for 
example that retired people strongly support redistribution towards the elderly. Despite finding 
significant differences in WTP, none of their corresponding hypotheses is strongly supported 
by the results. We argue that this is mostly driven by the isolated analysis of single observable 
factors and by neglecting unobservable characteristics. 
Thus this study represents the first attempt to identify social interest groups in the context of 
redistribution based on the analysis of preference heterogeneity by taking into account the in-
teraction of different observable as well as latent characteristics. We consider various determi-
nants focusing on socio-demographic characteristics and by virtue of the DCE analyze them in 
direct relation to the volume and the allocation of the redistributive resources. Applying a La-
tent Class Model (LCM) allows not only to account for unobservable characteristics but also 
to approximate the size of these social interest groups and potential coalitions thereof. Thus we 
add to the literature by overcoming methodological challenges of prior studies and extending 
the analysis with regard to latent interest groups. 
3 Econometrics  
Preferences for redistribution are difficult to measure as redistribution is a good that is not 
traded in real economic markets and preferences are not revealed or observed directly. In such 
cases, stated preference techniques can serve as a tool for identifying these preferences (e.g. 
Louviere et al., 2000). We apply a DCE to capture preferences for redistribution. This concept 
is consistent with traditional microeconomics treating preferences as a latent construct that is 
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revealed by choices. Within a choice experiment, individuals face a decision between at least 
two alternatives. Each alternative, in our case redistribution schemes, exhibits the same attrib-
utes – i.e. characteristics defining the good – but varies regarding the attribute levels – i.e. the 
quantity of each attribute. Following utility maximization, the chosen alternative must be the 
one contributing the highest utility. 
The underlying theory of DCE is based on Lancaster’s Consumer Theory (LCT) (Lancaster, 
1966) and Random Utility Theory (RUT) (Luce, 1959; McFadden, 1974). In LCT, consumer 
preferences are defined in relation to bundles of characteristics and the demand for goods is a 
derived demand. Consumption is the activity of extracting characteristics from goods (Gravelle 
and Rees, 2004). The model applied in the parametric analysis of responses is a Mixed Logit 
Model which can be derived in a number of different ways (see Hensher and Greene, 2003; 
Train, 2003). The point of departure is a model formulation which incorporates an error com-
ponent (EC). Following Scarpa et al. (2005) an Alternative Specific Constant (ASC) is speci-
fied for the status quo alternative in order to capture the systematic component of a potential 
status quo effect. Furthermore, an error component additional to the usual Gumbel-distributed 
error term is incorporated in the model to capture any remaining status quo effects in the sto-
chastic part of utility. The error component, μ, which is implemented as zero-mean normally 
distributed random parameter, is assigned exclusively to the status quo alternatives. Thus, the 
error component captures any additional variance associated with the cognitive effort of eval-
uating the status quo alternative relative to the experimental designed hypothetical alternative 
– positive or negative (Brownstone and Train, 1998; Herriges and Phaneuf, 2002; Scarpa et al., 
2005; Scarpa et al., 2008). This results in the following general utility structure: 
 
(3.1) 
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where the indirect utility, V, is a function of the vector of explanatory variables, xnjt, and asso-
ciated parameters, β. For the status quo alternative, the error component μ enters the indirect 
utility function, while it is restricted to zero for the experimental designed policy alternative. 
The unobserved error term εntj is assumed iid extreme value distributed. The individuals are 
denoted by n, while j is the alternative and t is the choice set. The probability of individual n 
choosing alternative k out of j alternatives can be defined by the Conditional Logit Model: 
 
(3.2) 
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P
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where β’ is a vector of all betas, λ is the scale parameter which is typically normalized to unity. 
Following Train (2009) and Scarpa et al. (2005), the probabilities of the ECL mixed logit type 
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model can be described as integrals of the standard conditional logit function evaluated at dif-
ferent µ’s with a density function as the mixing distribution. Furthermore, this specification 
can be generalized to allow for repeated choices by the same respondent, i.e. a panel structure, 
by letting z be a sequence of alternatives, one for each choice occasion, z ={z1,…,zT}. Thus, the 
error component coefficient may vary over people but is constant over the T choice occasions 
for each individual. The marginal choice probability then becomes: 
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Where  20,    is the normal density distribution function for µ.  
We elaborate on this model by taking preference heterogeneity for the program attributes into 
account, by the introduction of a Mixed Logit Model. 
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Where f is the density distribution function for β with a mean of b and a standard deviation of 
η. This model also holds the error component specification, in the case where μ= βμ~f(μ|0,σ2). 
In this specific case, all program attributes and the error component are assigned to follow a 
normal distribution. 
Finally, we examine whether the true distributions of some of the coefficients are better ex-
plained by using more flexible distributions, which do not necessarily match a convenient 
mathematical form (see e.g. Wedel et al., 1999; Hess et al., 2007). By applying a Latent Class 
specification we can avoid the issue of predefined statistical distributions as in the mixed logit 
case, but some may argue that the LCM is less flexible than the Mixed Logit Model, since the 
number of possible values for the taste coefficients is finite (this issue should though be ex-
pected to decrease as the number of points used increases). An illustration of an example where 
more flexible distributions are needed would e.g. be in the case where a mass of the respondents 
is located around zero, while the remaining part of the respondents either are located around a 
strictly positive value or a strictly negative value. So instead of using a continues mixture dis-
tribution as above, we separate the heterogeneity by applying a latent class logit specification. 
The unconditional choice probability for alternative k and individual n is given by: 
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Where S is the number of classes, πs is the probability that individual n belongs to class s, and 
Pn(k|βs) is the probability of individual n choosing alternative k conditional on individual n 
being in class s.  
Equation 3.5 implicitly assumes the same probability for the scale classes across all the taste 
classes, thus implying that the scale is confounded within the estimated beta parameter. To 
avoid the issue of scale when comparing marginal utilities, we instead examine marginal rates 
of substitutions (MRS/MWTP), so that the scale parameter λ from equation (3.2) cancels out, 
thus we are able to compare estimates across classes. Since the utility function is linear in price, 
the marginal WTP (MWTP) for the attribute is the ratio between the parameter of the attribute 
and the price parameter, such that: 
 
(3.6)  
Attribute  parameter
MWTP
Price  parameter
 
  
 
In the interpretation of the results, we both consider the program attributes as well as the de-
terminants of class membership. With regard to the latter, class membership is determined by 
socio-demographic variables. The inclusion of these was based on a priori expectations which 
we will elaborate on below. Finally, to circumvent the risk of being trapped in a local maxi-
mum instead of reaching the global maximum of the likelihood function, the estimation pro-
cess was repeated 10 times using different starting values. We have used the software pack-
age NLOGIT to estimate the econometric models. 
 
4 Design of the choice experiment 
Design and data presentation 
The hypothetical nature of DCEs requires the incorporation of the relevant attributes affecting 
individuals’ utility and choice behavior respectively. Following Bateman et al. (2002), the 
setup of the DCE – including the selection of relevant attributes, the assignment of meaningful 
attribute levels as well as the application of an experimental design to create a manageable 
number of choice – was developed using evidence from the existing literature, expert inter-
views, group discussions, and paper based pretests involving 629 students and faculty mem-
bers. Finally, the DCE setup has been tested in three independently conducted pretests with 
about 40 participants each.  
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To reduce the complexity of the experiment, the German social service budget – which sum-
marizes all social spending, including public and social insurance spending – served as a start-
ing point for the selection of relevant attributes. The social service budget has one major ad-
vantage, as all dimensions of redistribution are merged into a limited number of categories 
reflecting different beneficiaries of redistribution. Therefore, we chose a number of potential 
attributes based on this source which were then successively revised during the process 
sketched out above. 
At the end, we singled out ten attributes which are grouped together in four diagrams to reflect 
the substitutive character and to make the inherent trade-offs explicit: First, the price attribute 
is the personal tax and social insurance contribution individuals have to pay out of their 
monthly gross income. Second, the level of redistribution is measured as percentage of GDP. 
Third, five attributes reflect the socio-demographic status of beneficiaries (i.e. sick persons and 
persons in need of care, families with children, retirees, unemployed, working poor). Finally, 
the forth group covers the nationality of the recipients (i.e. German, West-European, other).  
The second step incorporates the assignment of attribute levels. They should be plausible, re-
alistic and sufficiently spaced to make respondents trade-off the different attribute and levels 
between the alternatives (cf. Bateman et al., 2002; Telser, 2002). To begin with, we chose the 
levels of the status quo based on official statistics following the German social service budget 
for each attribute. Following this, other realistic and plausible attribute levels were assigned 
for each attribute to translate into a meaningful setting for the respondents. Table 1 presents 
the chosen attributes and their respective levels – categorized by their substitutive relationship.  
The complete factorial design – containing all possible combinations of attributes and their 
levels – results in a total of 129,600 combinations (alternatives) that cannot be realized in an 
experiment. Accordingly, we apply a D-optimal fractional factorial design (see Kanninen, 
2002; Kuhfeld et al., 1994; Kuhfeld, 2006)1 resulting in 49 unique alternatives. As this number 
of alternatives still exceeds the mental burden respondents are able to handle (see e.g. Bech et 
al., 2011), the number of choice tasks was further split into seven blocks – each block consisting 
of 7 choice sets. Each choice set consisted of a fixed status quo and a hypothetical redistributive 
scheme. Comparing a fixed status quo with one alternative ensures that comparisons of utilities 
always refer to an identical reference point. Respondents were randomly assigned to one of 
these blocks.  
 
  
                                                 
1 While the D-optimality was developed essentially for linear estimation models, Carson et al. (1994) suggest that 
the application for non-linear models such as probit or logit is also possible. 
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Table 1: Attributes, labels and levels 
Attribute Explanation Levels in % 
Tax Personal tax and social insurance contributions2  15, 25, 30, 35, 45 
Redistribution Total amount of redistribution as a percentage of GDP 20, 25, 30, 35, 45 
Socio-demographic status of beneficiaries 
Retirees Retirees 30, 40, 45 
Sick Sick persons and persons in need of care 30, 35, 40 
Unemployed Unemployed 5, 10, 15 
Families Families with children 5, 10, 15, 20 
Working poor Working poor 5, 10 
Nationality of recipients 
German German citizens 75, 80, 85, 90 
West Europe West-European 5, 10 
Other Other nationalities 5, 10, 15 
Note: attribute levels in bold mark the status quo value. 
 
Administration of the Survey 
Figure 1 shows one of the final choice tasks. In each choice situation, the alternative represent-
ing the status quo was placed on the left side. On the right side, an alternative offering a hypo-
thetical redistributive scheme – which simultaneously differ in one or more attribute levels 
compared to the status quo alternative – was presented. Respondents were able to directly com-
pare both options and check which one they preferred.  
Figure 1: Choice situation 
 
                                                 
2 Averages for the personal income tax are chosen as the progressivity of the German income tax cannot be cov-
ered. If personal income tax would be individual specific – e.g. with respect to the progression – the econometri-
cally required independency of attributes and individuals would fail. As this is a critical assumption we test for 
this, e.g. by adjusting for income levels. 
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The DCE and a complementing questionnaire were administrated in the field by the market 
research institute GfK Nuremburg. Participants were recruited using a national quota sample3 
of the German voting age population and interviewed face-to-face with computer assistance. 
The latter ensures that respondents were not able to go back and forth between choice tasks 
and helped to reduce the complexity of the experiment. 
In the first part of the interview process, socio-demographic characteristics and attitudes to-
wards different aspects of redistribution were collected. The second part gave the respondents 
a comprehensive description of the current structure, volume and interdependencies of the Ger-
man welfare state (see online appendix) to obtain unbiased estimates and ensure that all partic-
ipants have a common knowledge. About one quarter of the interview time was been spent on 
this aspect. Within the description, all attributes and their corresponding levels were introduced 
consecutively. Participants were instructed that the hypothetical redistributive schemes poten-
tially were to be implemented in the future, asking them to decide which one they would choose 
if only the status quo alternative and the respective hypothetical scenario existed. To avoid 
learning effects, two warm-up decisions were included in the description. Following this and 
giving the respondents the chance to clarify open questions, the seven choice-tasks were con-
secutively presented. After the participants made their decisions, more sensitive information 
such as participants’ income and questions for further robustness tests were collected. It took 
the participants about 36 minutes on average to answer the questions and to complete the choice 
tasks. Respondents were provided with a small in-kind acknowledgement upon completion. 
 
Data and class membership variables 
Data from a representative cross-section survey of 1,538 German individuals of voting age 
conducted in 2012 are used to analyze preferences for redistribution. Table 1 compares some 
selected items from the dataset with data from official statistics. The presented mean values of 
these items do not differ significantly from each other indicating a high degree of representa-
tiveness. 
Table 1: Representativeness 
 Sample Official Statistics 
Female 0.516 0.509 
East German 0.214 0.197 
Age   
 18-29 0.169 0.171 
 30-39 0.141 0.143 
 40-49 0.203 0.201 
 50-59 0.171 0.171 
 60+ 0.316 0.314 
Gross income from employment 2,172 € 2,150 €1) 
Weighted data of the sample. 1) The value is based on measures from 2005 and 
extrapolated to 2012 using the general wage development. 
Source: Statistisches Bundesamt (2011); BMAS (2008). 
                                                 
3 Quota samples – as an equal alternative to random sampling – are frequently applied in social science research 
(cf. ESOMAR, 2006). The sample is stratified by age, gender, education, federal state, household size, location 
indicator and household net income. Due to the nature of the sampling procedure, take-up rates are not available. 
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The dependent variable in our econometric models is the binary variable choice, reflecting 
individual’s decision for the status quo (zero) or a hypothetical alternative redistributive 
scheme (one). With a mean value of 0.35, about one third of the decisions were made in favor 
of a hypothetical redistributive scheme.  
To identify latent interest groups, we select a set of nine socio-demographic characteristics 
based on existing evidence and relevance to inform policy makers about voting coalitions. Ta-
ble 2 show the class membership variables used in the later Latent Class Models and how they 
are defined, including mean value and std. dev.  
Table 2: Description of class membership variables. 
Variable name Label Mean Std. Dev. 
Female 1 if female, 0 if male 0.52 0.50 
Married 1 if married, 0 if not married 0.54 0.50 
Poor 
1 if equivalent household net income is less than 60% of the 
mean, 0 if not 
0.21 0.41 
Transfer 
1 if receives unemployment benefits, housing benefits or so-
cial welfare, 0 if not 
0.06 0.23 
Retired 1 if retired, 0 if not retired 0.26 0.44 
SAH self-assessed health (1=very good – 5=very bad) 2.25 0.85 
Child Benefits 1 if receives child benefits, 0 if not 0.28 0.45 
Fam-members unempl. 1 if family members or friends are unemployed, 0 if not 0.37 0.48 
Fam-members sick 
1 if family members or friends suffer from severe chronically 
diseases, 0 if not 
0.47 0.50 
 
In detail, we chose characteristics which reflect potential beneficiaries of redistribution. For 
example, the variable poor or transfer indicates potential recipients of redistribution towards 
working poor. Respondents with a (very) bad health status are supposed to benefit from an 
extension of redistribution devoted to sick and people in need of care (the same is likely for 
individuals with family members who suffer from severe diseases). The descriptive statistics 
in table 2 reveal about 26 % of the sample to be retired. Half of the sample has family members 
or friends suffering from severe chronically diseases. The average self-assessed health status 
is 2.25 which is somewhere between good and ok. In the following analysis, these characteris-
tics are supposed to define distinct social interest groups regarding preferences for redistribu-
tion.4 
5 Results 
Before turning to the LCM and the corresponding analysis of social interest groups we assess 
the appropriateness of different models and first look at the results of an Error Component 
                                                 
4 We do not account for any nationality variables for explaining class membership as the sample aims at the 
German voting age population. By law, foreigners do not have this right. However, there are 2.5 % foreigners in 
our dataset. Stratified by individuals from Western Europe (0.65 %) and other countries (1.75 %), the number of 
observations is too small to be included in an empirical analysis. Additionally, only 2.5 % of the sample do have 
a migration background. 
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Logit Model and of a Random Parameter Logit Model in table 3. As the results show all main 
effects of the program attributes in both models are significant, while this also goes for the 
standard deviation of the program attributes in the RPL model, except for the attribute working 
poor. A comparison of the two models shows no differences in signs across attributes or with 
respect to the internal ranking of the attributes. Comparing the fit of the two models by running 
a LR test shows that the RPL model clearly outperforms the ECL model – with an improvement 
of more than 200 LL units on the expense of 8 additional parameters (with a Chi-square dis-
tributed test result of 414 versus a critical value of 15.51 with 8 df.).  
Table 3: Error Component Logit and Random Parameter Logit Model results. 
 ECL RPL 
 Coefficient Std. Err. P-value Coefficient Std. Err. P-value 
ASC 0.499 0.038 <0.0001 0.784 0.064 <0.0001 
Tax -0.085 0.003 <0.0001 -0.147 0.007 <0.0001 
Redistribution 0.042 0.003 <0.0001 0.063 0.006 <0.0001 
Beneficiaries (base - sick and persons in need of care)     
Working Poor -0.041 0.010 0.0001 -0.066 0.018 0.0002 
Unemployed -0.033 0.007 <0.0001 -0.057 0.011 <0.0001 
Retirees 0.028 0.006 <0.0001 0.061 0.010 <0.0001 
Families and children 0.026 0.007 0.0001 0.036 0.011 0.0006 
Nationality of recipients (base - German)      
West Europe -0.066 0.009 <0.0001 -0.127 0.015 <0.0001 
Others -0.055 0.005 <0.0001 -0.086 0.009 <0.0001 
Std. dev. of random parameters       
EC 0.640 0.038 <0.0001 0.971 0.070 <0.0001 
Tax    0.147 0.007 <0.0001 
Redistribution    0.089 0.009 <0.0001 
Beneficiaries (base - sick and persons in need of care)     
Working Poor    0.075 0.082 0.3583 
Unemployed    0.123 0.018 <0.0001 
Retirees    0.143 0.012 <0.0001 
Families and children    0.144 0.015 <0.0001 
Nationality of recipients (base - German)      
West Europe    0.175 0.029 <0.0001 
Others    0.133 0.018 <0.0001 
Number of observations 10766   10766   
LL -6397   -6190   
Adj. Rho squared 0.1420   0.1692   
# Parameters 10   18   
AIC3 12823   12433   
AIC 12813   12415   
BIC 6443   6273   
 
Turning back to the results from the base models, they both suggest that people in general are 
against a tax increase, but would like to have a larger budget for redistribution – none of these 
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results are surprising. Examining in more detail whom this money should be handed to, our 
results show that respondents prefer to redistribute more to retirees, as well as to families with 
children compared to people who are sick or in need of care (our base level). On the contrary, 
the results also show that respondents prefer to decrease the redistribution to unemployed and 
low income individuals (although the latter group is working (working poor)) compared to sick 
and people in need of care. In addition, the results show that individuals in general prefer to 
redistribute to beneficiaries with a German nationality compared to recipients coming from 
both within and beyond the western part of Europe, respectively. 
Finally, when examining the heterogeneity in the samples – i.e. the standard deviations – the 
results of the RPL model show that a large degree of heterogeneity is observed across most 
attributes. This potentially suggests that a rather large proportion of the respondents have either 
substantially weaker or stronger preferences than the estimated mean, which again could imply 
that the sample is highly segmented. This is further investigated by applying a LCM. 
Before going more into the interpretation of the coefficients in the LCM, we examine the ap-
propriate number of classes. Determination of the optimal numbers of classes is done by a 
balanced assessment of the statistics reported in table 4. To some extent the log likelihood value 
decreases as more classes are added, indicating the presence of multiple segments in the sam-
ple. The AIC and AIC3 is minimized in the six class model (compared to the other LCM) 
whereas the BIC criterion is minimized with the two class model5. Thus the choice between 
LC models is now between the two class model and the six class model. Running a Likelihood 
ratio test reveals that the six class models outperforms the two class model6. Now comparing 
the six class model with the RPL model, table 4 shows, that with respect to AIC, AIC3 and the 
BIC criterion, the RPL model seems best, but again running a Likelihood ratio test, the six class 
model end up with an improvement of 84 LL units on the expense of 86 additional parameters. 
This improvement is significant (with a Chi-square distributed test result of 168 versus a critical 
value of 108.65 with 86 df.), and we end up by choosing the six-class model. 
Table 4: Comparison of model fit statistics. 
 MNL EC RPL LC2 LC3 LC4 LC5 LC6 LC7 LC8 
Number of observations 10766 10766 10766 10766 10766 10766 10766 10766 10766 10766 
LL -6465 -6397 -6190 -6223 -6354 -6353 -6437 -6106 -6347 -6291 
Adj. Rho squared 0.0757 0.142 0.1692 0.1639 0.1448 0.1434 0.1306 0.1738 0.1396 0.1456 
# Parameters 9 10 18 28 47 66 85 104 123 142 
AIC3 12956 12823 12433 12530 12849 12905 13128 12524 13063 13009 
AIC 12947 12813 12415 12502 12802 12839 13043 12420 12940 12867 
BIC 6507 6443 6273 6353 6572 6660 6831 6589 6918 6951 
 
As can be seen from the results of the below six class model presented in table 5, across all six 
classes all individuals show negative preferences for the tax attribute, which implies that paying 
more in tax provides less utility – as expected. However, clear differences between preferences 
                                                 
5 AIC3 (Bozdogan AIC) is (-2LL+3P); AIC (Akaike Information Criterion) is (-2LL+2P); BIC (Bayesian Infor-
mation Criterion) is –LL+(P/2)*ln(N) 
6 Results can be received from the authors upon request.  
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in the different classes are found – especially between the preferences of to whom the redistri-
bution should be provided to – the beneficiaries. One could argue that these differences were 
due to differences in scale, but as can be seen the estimates goes in different directions across 
classes, and hence cannot (solely) be explained by scale differences between classes. As men-
tioned above – the scaling issue can be overcome by comparing MRSs between classes, thus 
we turn directly to discussing the results in terms of MRS, which in our case can be interpreted 
as WTP.  
Table 6 shows the WTP estimates across all six classes. The estimates are to be interpreted as 
individuals’ WTP in percentage points of their monthly gross income per additional percentage 
point of one of the other attributes – e.g. redistribution, working poor, unemployed etc. The 
alternative specific constant (ASC) represents the preference for the status quo, i.e. if this is 
negative, a general aversion against any form of change is expressed. To opt for an alternative, 
the benefits achieved by changes in the attributes have to outweigh the disutility that is caused 
by having to move away from the status quo in the first place.  
This interpretation of the LCM by examining the preferences in each class along with the class 
specific probabilities – the probability of class membership relative to the sixth class – further-
more allows us to derive insights on the composition and potential coalitions of latent interest 
groups. I.e. in our interpretation each of the classes represents one statistically determined la-
tent interest group with similar preferences, the composition of these groups being driven by 
the selected observable socio-demographic as well as unknown latent characteristics. 
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Table 5: Latent Class Model with 6 classes. 
 LC6-CL1 LC6-CL2 LC6-CL3 LC6-CL4 LC6-CL5 LC6-CL6 
 Coef. Std. Err. P-value Coef. Std. Err. P-value Coef. Std. Err. P-value Coef. Std. Err. P-value Coef. Std. Err. P-value Coef. Std. Err. P-value 
ASC -0.899 1.128 0.43 1.103* 0.120 <0.0001 0.389* 0.128 0.0023 0.634* 0.095 <0.0001 0.709 0.287 0.0136 -0.238 0.257 0.3533 
Tax -0.500* 0.208 0.02 -0.048* 0.009 <0.0001 -0.060* 0.011 <0.0001 -0.087* 0.007 <0.0001 -0.154* 0.031 <0.0001 -0.479* 0.062 <0.0001 
Redistribution 0.135* 0.073 0.07 0.080* 0.011 <0.0001 0.008 0.010 0.4115 0.042* 0.007 <0.0001 0.109* 0.029 0.0002 0.083* 0.019 <0.0001 
Beneficiaries (base - sick and persons in need of care) 
Working Poor -0.564* 0.332 0.09 -0.110* 0.034 0.0011 0.007 0.035 0.8521 -0.024 0.025 0.3421 -0.025 0.080 0.7502 -0.025 0.068 0.7124 
Unemployed -0.577* 0.284 0.04 0.021 0.020 0.3087 -0.071* 0.024 0.0036 -0.028* 0.017 0.0961 -0.082 0.056 0.1415 0.008 0.045 0.8491 
Retirees 0.289* 0.153 0.06 0.020 0.018 0.2723 -0.044* 0.021 0.0375 0.023 0.014 0.1130 0.325* 0.076 <0.0001 0.099* 0.038 0.0085 
Families and children -0.464* 0.248 0.06 0.005 0.020 0.7891 0.050* 0.019 0.0072 0.036* 0.017 0.0373 0.022 0.059 0.7045 0.103* 0.040 0.0099 
Nationality of recipients (base - German) 
West Europe 0.048 0.164 0.77 -0.057* 0.026 0.0309 -0.057* 0.029 0.0487 -0.032 0.022 0.1491 -0.159* 0.073 0.0285 -0.152* 0.049 0.0021 
Others 0.121 0.183 0.51 -0.043* 0.017 0.0093 -0.057* 0.016 0.0003 -0.070* 0.014 <0.0001 -0.247* 0.050 <0.0001 -0.041 0.036 0.2506 
Class probability variables 
Constant -1.962* 1.086 0.07 -0.280 0.387 0.4696 -0.050 0.486 0.9174 -4.801 58.278 -0.9343 -2.821* 0.798 0.0004    
Self-assessed-health 0.435 0.434 0.32 0.458* 0.163 0.0049 0.290 0.201 0.1492 -0.371 1.324 0.7796 0.772* 0.235 0.0010    
Poor -0.025 0.884 0.98 0.054 0.316 0.8652 0.020 0.363 0.9571 -0.062 0.367 0.8651 -0.005 0.468 0.9917    
Recives transfer paym. 0.591 2.584 0.82 0.079 0.563 0.8879 0.221 0.603 0.7145 -0.021 1.117 0.9850 0.214 1.148 0.8524    
Retired 0.023 1.148 0.98 1.490* 0.418 0.0004 -0.116 0.577 0.8403 -3.850* 0.577 <0.0001 3.072* 0.604 <0.0001    
Female 0.819 0.606 0.18 -0.128 0.229 0.5768 0.217 0.280 0.4381 0.455 1.795 0.8001 0.225 0.374 0.5462    
Recieves child benefits 0.005 0.558 0.99 0.003 0.218 0.9897 -0.004 0.021 0.8377 -0.009 0.048 0.8461 -0.004 0.021 0.8320    
Married 0.046 0.560 0.93 -0.003 0.251 0.9898 -0.025 0.293 0.9327 -4.438 42.955 0.9177 -0.759* 0.396 0.0556    
Fam-members unempl. -2.534 2.212 0.25 -0.139 0.238 0.5578 -0.002 0.291 0.9955 0.770 1.889 0.6834 -0.274 0.393 0.4855    
Fam-members sick -1.464* 0.779 0.06 -0.406 0.249 0.1027 -0.499 0.305 0.1023 4.327 58.114 -0.9406 -0.312 0.403 0.4388    
Avg class probability 0.032   0.299   0.227   0.193   0.101   0.147   
# observations 10766                  
LL -6106                  
Adj. Rho squared 0.1738                  
# Parameters 104                  
AIC3 12524.47016                  
AIC 12420.47016                  
BIC 6589.010792                  
Note: * indicates significance level at 10% or below. 
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Table 6: Mean and varians of marginal willingness-to-pay values for the six class model. 
 LC6-CL1 LC6-CL2 LC6-CL3 LC6-CL4 LC6-CL5 LC6-CL6 
 Mean Var P-value Mean Var P-value Mean Var P-value Mean Var P-value Mean Var P-value Mean Var P-value 
ASC -1.80 3.19 0.3147 23.12 23.95 <0.0001 6.49 5.29 0.0048 7.31 1.24 <0.0001 4.59 3.52 0.0145 -0.50 0.27 0.3421 
Redistribution 0.27 0.01 0.0048 1.68 0.10 <0.0001 0.14 0.03 0.3762 0.48 0.00 <0.0001 0.71 0.02 <0.0001 0.17 0.00 <0.0001 
Beneficiaries (base - sick and persons in need of care)                
Working Poor -1.13 0.13 0.002 -2.30 0.74 0.0076 0.11 0.34 0.8523 -0.28 0.09 0.3448 -0.16 0.27 0.7522 -0.05 0.02 0.712 
Unemployed -1.15 0.05 <0.0001 0.44 0.20 0.3316 -1.19 0.21 0.009 -0.33 0.04 0.1011 -0.53 0.11 0.1076 0.02 0.01 0.8485 
Retirees 0.58 0.05 0.0094 0.42 0.16 0.2833 -0.73 0.14 0.0514 0.26 0.03 0.1052 2.10 0.19 <0.0001 0.21 0.00 0.0023 
Families and children -0.93 0.08 0.0009 0.11 0.18 0.7895 0.84 0.12 0.016 0.42 0.04 0.0328 0.14 0.14 0.7013 0.21 0.01 0.0061 
Nationality of recipients (base - German)                 
Westen Europe 0.10 0.10 0.7666 -1.19 0.39 0.0556 -0.95 0.28 0.0727 -0.37 0.07 0.1544 -1.03 0.25 0.0388 -0.32 0.01 0.0021 
Others 0.24 0.09 0.4275 -0.91 0.12 0.0086 -0.95 0.10 0.0025 -0.81 0.03 <0.0001 -1.60 0.09 <0.0001 -0.09 0.01 0.2436 
Note: The variance of WTP was calculated using the Delta-method (Greene, 2008). 
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Latent interest groups 
Class 1 is labeled as Opinionated Minority. Representing only 3 % of the population its political 
relevance is very limited. Compared to the other groups, the WTP for an extension of redistri-
bution is modest. They favor a shift towards the sick and the retirees, and have a stronger aver-
sion regarding support of working poor than all other classes (almost the same for unemployed). 
Furthermore they are the only group with a significant negative WTP for redistribution towards 
families and children. Furthermore, class one is the only group that does not exhibit a significant 
negative WTP against at least one of the two nationality based groups, i.e. Western Europe and 
/ or other nations. Summarizing, the very pronounced preferences regarding the recipients sug-
gest that the members have strong opinions that diverge from the majority. Nonetheless, overall 
the group is rather of limited interest due to very small number of members. 
The label Conservative Retirees could be used to characterize class 2, which represents about 
30 % of the population. Most importantly, these individuals have a very pronounced preference 
for the status quo and are very likely to object any form of reform. The WTP to maintain the 
status quo not only dwarfs all attributes but also is by far the highest across all groups. Despite 
this, they exhibit the highest WTP for an extension of redistribution of all classes, i.e. more than 
twice the WTP of the second highest class. Regarding the allocation of resources the WTP 
estimates suggest a shift from the working poor towards the sick. The retirees themselves are 
not supposed to benefit above average from the extension of the overall budget for redistribu-
tion. This is surprising, as being a retiree (together with an unfavorable SAH) is a strong pre-
dictor for being member of this group. Thus we characterize them as to some extent being 
egoistic despite the fact that they do not show preferences for redistribution towards the elderly 
per se. These individuals are likely to benefit from increasing the share for the sick and indi-
viduals with need for long term care because they themselves are considered having an unfa-
vorable SAH. This seems plausible, especially when contrasting this group with the members 
of class 5. In addition, the members of this group also show preferences towards redistributing 
less to recipients from outside Germany. Overall, the group configuration seems to be very 
plausible regarding preferred recipients and membership predicting variables. The group is 
likely to have considerable political relevance due to its size. However, despite the strong pref-
erence for an increase of redistribution this group is rather impeding than leading change and 
has a strong interest in maintaining the status quo. 
Class 3 represents a quite distinct group of individuals that could be characterized as Cost con-
scious Family Advocates covering 23 % of the population. This group is against a change of the 
overall level of redistribution, i.e. the WTP is not significantly different from zero. The indi-
viduals have the highest WTP for shifts in favor of families and children of all groups and would 
like to do this especially on expense of the unemployed and the retirees. Similar to the other 
groups they strongly prefer German recipients. None of the observable factors that we used to 
predict class membership stands out for this group. Thus latent characteristics such as prefer-
ences regarding the recipient groups seem to be the primary driving force. Nonetheless, just by 
the pure size of the group their reluctance regarding a change of the redistributive budget is 
likely to have some political weight. In contrast to the preceding group their WTP for the status 
quo – despite being highly significant – is much smaller and it is realistic that reform options 
presented to this group reach a level of attractiveness that compensate the disutility suffered 
from change. 
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We label Class 4 Indifferent Working Age Population. The members – 19 % of the population 
– have a positive WTP for an extension of redistribution on a slightly below average level 
compared to the other groups. Besides an aversion against recipients from other nations, they 
have no interest in changing the allocation between the different recipient groups. Being not 
retired considerably increases the probability of being member of this class. Due to its size and 
the lack of extreme positions on shifts between recipient groups, this class seems to be a likely 
coalition partner, however, one that also appreciates the advantages of the status quo. 
Class 5 exhibits a rather pronounced profile which could be classified as Egoistic Single Retir-
ees. Representing 10 % of the population it is the second smallest group. The second highest 
WTP for an increase of redistribution goes along with a very strong preference for reallocating 
resources in favor of the retirees, thus benefiting twice – firstly, from the general increase of 
the budget and, secondly, from giving a higher proportion to the elderly. In contrast to the pre-
ceding groups this makes it comparatively easy for these individuals to leave the status quo. 
Looking at the variables used to predict class membership it seems quite likely that self-interest 
is a very strong motive for this group, which consists mainly out of retired individuals with a 
below average health status that are not married. Again this goes along with a very pronounced 
aversion against non German recipient groups. 
The last group, class 6, is difficult to characterize and could capture what we call the Residual 
Average. This group has the second lowest WTP for an extension of redistribution of all classes 
and prefers a shift away from the sick towards retirees and families. Being the reference class, 
no completely clear picture emerges regarding class membership. But representing 15 % of the 
population the class still has some political relevance, especially as there is no strong interest 
to maintain the status quo. 
Summarizing, we could identify six distinct social interest groups, most of which have a quite 
clear and plausible profile. All but one have a significantly positive WTP in favor of an exten-
sion of the overall budget for redistribution. But regarding the ends of the redistributive 
measures, it is still unclear, which results the political process might produce. For this reason 
we now turn towards potential coalitions. For the sake of simplicity we disregard the nationality 
of the recipient groups. 
 
Coalition analysis 
Class 1 seems to have too extreme positions for joining a larger coalition. Furthermore, its small 
size reduces its relevance also for the other groups. As illustrated by figure 2, there is an almost 
perfect match between class 4 and 6, adding up to 34 % of the population. When looking for 
potential coalition partners class 3 differs as it favors families with children over retirees and 
the unemployed. But what makes class 3 still a likely ally is a fairly similar preference regarding 
the overall level of redistribution, i.e. none of these groups has a pronounced interest in a con-
siderable increase of the overall redistributive budget. This aspect makes class 2 an unlikely 
coalition partner, as this group’s WTP for an expansion of redistribution is too high and their 
aversion against the working poor is too strong. Together group 4, 6 and 3 would achieve a 
majority of 57 %. 
Groups 2 and 5 are very likely to form an opposition coalition. Both retiree groups have a high 
preference for a considerable increase of the overall level of redistribution and seem to be a 
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reasonable match despite some differences regarding some recipient groups (see figure 3). To-
gether they add up to 40 % of the population. 
Putting this in the context of the current political situation in Germany one has to consider that 
the right to vote does not directly translate into the participation in elections. In the German 
2013 election, the turnout of voters was significantly higher in the elderly population. While in 
the age groups between 18 and 60 years the participation was between 60 and 74 %, the range 
for people aged 60 and older was between 75 and 80 % (Bundeswahlleiter, 2014). Assuming 
that there is a strong correlation between age and being retired, this directly affects the political 
power of the identified social interest groups. Measured in voters the coalition of group 2 and 
5 grows. The result is a quite small – if any – majority for the coalition of group 3, 4 and 6. 
 
Figure 2: Coalitions between social interest groups – the working age population 
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Figure 3: Coalitions between social interest groups – the elderly population 
 
Furthermore, none of the involved interest groups is in favor of a reduction of the overall budget 
for redistribution. Looking at the outcome of the 2013 election, this is likely to be one (besides 
several other) reason(s), why parties such as the liberal democrats (FDP) that want to reduce 
the size of government did not make it over the five percent hurdle and are thus not represented 
in the German parliament (Bundeswahlleiter, 2014). The fact that there is no clear cut opposi-
tion – i.e. that parts of the population strictly oppose big government while other are strongly 
in favor thereof – is also in line with the current political climate in Germany that is reflected 
by the formation of the grand coalition and the respective coalition treaty (CDU et al., 2013).  
Looking at policies that target specific recipient groups one can see that in the current legislative 
period the unemployed are not in the focus. However, there is considerable activity regarding 
retirees. They will benefit from higher retirement pay for women who raised children and thus 
earned lower pension claims during their work life. The same legislation, enacted in July 2014, 
allows certain groups of individuals who have worked more than 45 years to retire before they 
reach the official retirement age. However, while experts argue for an increase of the official 
retirement age, the extension of benefits seems to be widely accepted in the general public 
(Rürup, 2011), though this is only partly supported by our results. 
The interests of families with children are also catered by both major parties, the discussion is 
primarily about the right way of how to do this, e.g. giving money to family members who stay 
at home to care for the children or rather investing the resources in daycare facilities. The core 
decisions on this were already taken by the two preceding governments (CDU/CSU/SPD and 
CDU/CSU/FDP) that enacted a legal entitlement to daycare and a child care subsidy (Be-
treuungsgeld). Until 2014, the federal subsidies for the extension of daycare facilities added up 
to 5.4 billion Euros and further annual subsidies of 0.84 billion Euros are planned as a perma-
nent installment (BMFSFJ, 2014). 
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Summarizing, what we see in Germany seems to be a grand coalition between all major social 
interest groups. The key concerns of the two groups (families with children and retirees) are 
both catered by the two large parties to attract as many voters as possible. As none of the groups 
is strongly opposed to higher levels of redistribution this is possible by increasing public ex-
penditures. Thus our approach has identified the same key factors that also drive policy making 
in Germany at the moment. 
6 Discussion and Conclusion 
This study is the first to apply latent class modelling on data from a DCE with the goal to 
identify social interest groups regarding preferences for redistribution. We argue that the usu-
ally applied methods are not capable of reflecting the complex interplay of different observable 
and latent determinants of these preferences. Based on the econometric analysis we can identify 
six social interest groups that differ regarding their preferences for redistribution and their com-
position. Both, their preferences regarding the overall budget for redistribution and their pref-
erences regarding the different recipient groups as well as the socio-demographic determinants 
for group membership are plausible and match well with the current political situation in Ger-
many. 
This contributes to the literature as no prior study has so far followed a similar approach to 
decompose preference heterogeneity within the field of redistribution. Usually, the evidence on 
the relevance of single socio-demographic determinants for preferences for the overall budget 
for redistribution or the size of government is mixed. For example, Alesina and Giuliano (2011) 
use different datasets to test a number of theory based hypotheses regarding the determinants 
for redistribution. In all their specifications they include age as control variable. While in some 
age seems to have an effect, in others the variable is not significant. Our results suggest that 
this may be at least partly explained by preference heterogeneity. Interpreting being a retiree as 
a proxy for age, we do find differences between the young and the elderly, but we also find 
considerable heterogeneity within these two groups. Using an approach that accounts for a dis-
crete distribution of the effects of latent characteristics allows us to separate the respective in-
dividuals in (more) consistent groups. We assume that making use of this method when revis-
iting known theoretical concepts explaining preferences for redistribution should provide a bet-
ter understanding of the currently heterogeneous empirical results. 
Turning towards the study of Neustadt and Zweifel (2011) highlights some of the strengths of 
our approach. Their work is closest to our study regarding the focus on different recipient 
groups and the use of a DCE. The authors argue along the line of the insurance motive and are 
surprised to find no support regarding the hypotheses that preferences for redistribution favor-
ing retirees are highest among this group and that WTP for redistribution in favor of people 
with ill health is expected to be higher among those who experience health problems among 
their close relatives. Our results show that there are two groups who are characterized by an 
over proportional share of retirees, but only one of them – the Egoistic Single Retirees (class 5) 
– show the expected behavior. Thus, the insurance motive seems to be a plausible explanation 
for this subgroup, while the Conservative Retirees (class 2) are likely determined by other fac-
tors. The health aspect is covered by two variables – SAH and Fam-members sick. While the 
latter is only significant regarding the small minority group, SAH is a strong predictor for being 
member in the two aforementioned retiree groups. Again, only for one of the two groups, i.e. 
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the Conservative Retirees, there is a significant WTP for a shift of resources towards the sick 
and the individuals in need of long term care. In contrast, the other group has even a positive 
WTP to shift resources away from the sick in favor of the retirees. Summarizing, regarding the 
insurance motive one could argue that the need of insurance is very heterogeneous even within 
the group of retirees. While some have a strong focus on health related issues, others are prob-
ably more worried about their retirement pay in general. Such very distinct preference patterns 
underline the presence of preference heterogeneity and the need to account for this. 
However, despite being able to give a much more detailed picture of the complex interrelations, 
some limitations apply. For example, sticking for the moment with the insurance motive, other 
very likely determinants – such as receiving child benefits – are not significant. One very likely 
cause is that we work with a limited number of classes, as beyond a certain point the “statistical 
costs” of breaking down the sample into even smaller groups outweighs the “statistical bene-
fits”. Thus we have to focus on the core social interest groups that have the greatest explanatory 
power from an econometrics point of view. Furthermore, the number of variables that can be 
used to explain class membership are also limited – e.g. by correlation patterns and availability. 
Driven by the explorative nature of our study we based our selection of variables on a priori 
expectations. As at the same time we had to avoid correlation patterns, we had to omit other 
relevant variables such as education or employment status. Depending on the specific research 
question other setups may be preferable. Furthermore, one has to be aware of the fact that the 
data has been collected at a specific point of time, which may limit the generalizability of the 
results. With regard to our study in 2012 the situation in Germany was on the one hand charac-
terized by the European debt crisis. On the other hand the unemployment rate was at an all-time 
low for reunified Germany (Bundesagentur für Arbeit, 2014). Such factors may likely influence 
the public opinion as well as the focus of respondents. Finally, as we use a different method, 
we cannot directly compare our results to the findings of other researchers. However, several 
robustness checks regarding the DCE itself as well as the comparison to the current political 
situation in Germany do support the internal as well as external validity of our results. Further 
research will though be needed to test this with alternative datasets and specifications. 
Summarizing, our results suggest that in Germany there is no opposition against an extension 
of the welfare state. Quite contrary, most social interest groups have a strong interest in increas-
ing the overall budget of redistribution. The groups differ regarding the preferred beneficiary 
groups and regarding the individuals’ observable and unobservable characteristics that deter-
mine class membership. The successful implementation of this approach in the context of re-
distribution should encourage further work along these lines, hopefully disentangling some of 
the so far rather heterogeneous empirical results on preferences for redistribution. 
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